STATEMENT A APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED

IA ASTisACI (AMxma200wa w
achieved by winning one grand victory early in war. Further, they believed that wholesale initial tactical successes could produce rapid strategic victory.
The events of 1914 to 1918 proved that belief to be false. The crushing weight of firepower facing First Vorld Var armies inhibited mobility and denied the participants strategic success until they succumbed to the exhaustion produced by a war of attrition. The Soviets, however, experienced a different phenomenon in their Civil Var.
During that three-year struggle, the vast spaces of, Russia and the in spite of all victorious fights before the battle, the fate of the campaign will be decided in the very last battle-interim defeats will be individual episodes.... In the warfare of large modern armies, defeat of the enemy results from the sun of continuous and planned victories on all fronts, successfully completed one after another and interconnected ih tis.
Kamonev rejected the possibility of using a grand strategic stroke to win quick victory In war (such as the Schlieffen Plan). Instead, he argued, "the uninterrupted conduct of operations is the main condition for victory.0 I. 1. Tukhachavoky, drawing upon his experiences along the Vistula in 1920, concluded that *the impossibility, on a modern broad front, of destroying the enemy army by one blow forces the achievement of that end by a series of successive operations.'-V. K. Utay enunciated the aim of conducting deep battle ES 1.L ok±.bWJ to achieve success in penetrating the tactical depth of enemy defenses by the siaultaneous use of iulantr7 support tanks and long-range action tanks cooperating with infantry, artillery, and aviation forces. This would also produce a capability to conduct more rapid operations. In consisted of simultaneous attacks on the enemy defense with all means of attack to the entire depth of the defense; a penetration of the tactical defense zone on selected directions and subsequent decisive development of tactical success into operational success by means of introducing into battle an echelon to develop success (tanks, motorized infantry, cavalry) and the landing of air assaults to achieve rapidly the desired aims.10
The theory of deep operations represented a qualitative Jump in the development of operational art, and it offered a total escape from the impasse of World War I positional warfare. Its implementation depended entirely on the Soviet ability to construct a viable armored and mechanized force. Eznn.a attacked in 250 to 300 kilometer sectors against objectives The Soviets also developed and tested air assault units. By the mid-th rties they had fielded three airborne brigades and three airborne r egiments to cooperate with exploiting Soviet ground forces. Elsewhere Commanders and staffs were not fully familiar with all of the theories of conducting deep battle and there were shortfalls in the material base that hindered its realization. Thus, during the war it was necessary to reassess and clarify some aspects of preparing and conducting offensive operations and decide anew many questions on the conduct of defensive operations on a strategic and operational scale.* A former associate of Tukhachesky and a survivor of the purges was more direct, stating:
The old, experienced military leaders, who created Soviet military theory and could with high artfulness put it into practice, were no more and there were Insufficient numbers of operationally prepared comanders at the beginning of war. Therefore, the painful dram played out in the summer of 1941 had a deep political and strategic maning related to the Stalin cult of personality. The consequences of that were inmensely painful. It cost tremendous casualties and evoked huge losses.** 4. Ibid.
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Ibid., 238.
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The Five-Year Plans, while providing the wherewithal for heavy Industry and the modernization of agriculture, created an industry suited for production of tanks. Producing tanks was but a small step from producing tractors. Infantry, preceeded with an artillery barrage, supported by attached tanks and artillery, secured against serial attacks by antiaircraft guns and its own aviation, destroys the enemy by a vigorous attack .... The second and following echelons are put Into action where success is achieved. The article clearly rejected the feasibility of using tank-pure formations (DD tanks) to effect a penetration. The editor, in characteristic fashion, added his "hopes that the readers of fraanaa Ziuzda will express their opinion on the questions touched upon by Comrade Kuzntsov,' and they did so in the ensuing debate. Som authors argued for the validity of deep operations, but most cited evidence from war experiences that more systematic means had to be developed for penetrating modern defenses than simple use of tank-heavy formations.
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